{"id":576,"date":"2026-05-23T17:14:46","date_gmt":"2026-05-23T17:14:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/?p=576"},"modified":"2026-05-23T17:14:56","modified_gmt":"2026-05-23T17:14:56","slug":"from-authoritarianism-to-democratic-reawakening-hungarys-election-turning-point","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/2026\/05\/23\/from-authoritarianism-to-democratic-reawakening-hungarys-election-turning-point\/","title":{"rendered":"From Authoritarianism to Democratic Reawakening: Hungary\u2019s Election Turning\u00a0Point"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Author: Ema Hor\u0148\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article provides an analysis of Hungary\u2019s political development, covering the historical background, all terms of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s leadership, recent elections, and possible future trajectories, serving as context for understanding the structure and evolution of the Hungarian political system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the seemingly never-ending rule of Viktor Orb\u00e1n, the long-standing tradition of authoritarianism and 16 years of corruption have finally been challenged. Hungary now faces an unprecedented political moment, raising questions about what comes next. What can be expected from the new prime minister and his party, and why is this shift widely seen as a fundamental victory for democracy, the European Union, and the Hungarian people?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Andrew Shiva (2015), Hungarian Parliament Building, Budapest, CC BY-SA 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Continuity of Authoritarian Patterns in Hungarian Political History<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In order to fully understand the context of Hungarian background and national political mentality, we need to provide a brief walk-through of its history and political development. The purpose of this overview is to support the central claim of this article: that Hungary has been shaped by a longstanding authoritarian political tradition dating back to the formation of the state, creating a sense of continuity and familiarity with strong, centralized leadership. This did not simply disappear after the fall of communism; instead, it persisted in patterns of political behavior, including the repeated re-election of Orb\u00e1n despite growing warning signs during his earlier terms in office. Throughout the article, I also explore how these dynamics evolved in the post-communist period and continued to influence Hungarian identity, pride, and nationalism, often becoming powerful themes in political campaigns and voter appeals. This perspective ultimately helps explain present-day political choices and highlights why the 2026 elections represent such a significant historical turning point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The first full recognition of Hungary as a state dates back to when Stephen I of Hungary was crowned, establishing the Kingdom of Hungary as a centralized medieval Christian monarchy with elite-dominated governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the famous Battle of Moh\u00e1cs, when the army of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary was defeated by the Ottoman Empire and the central state collapsed, the monarchy effectively ceased to function independently. Later on, the Habsburgs expelled the Ottomans, and Hungary became part of the Habsburg Monarchy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the 19th century, a reform movement emerged, led by figures such as Lajos Kossuth and Istv\u00e1n Sz\u00e9chenyi, which culminated in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. The revolution attempted to establish full independence and create a modern parliamentary government. After it failed, Hungary was ruled under a centralized imperial administration known as the Bach system. The Bach system imposed strict central control from Vienna, limited political freedoms, and sought to weaken Hungarian national institutions through bureaucratic rule and Germanization policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1867, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise created the Dual Monarchy under Emperor Franz Joseph. At that time, politics was largely controlled by the aristocracy, bureaucratic elites, and liberal nationalist politicians, and there was no fully competitive mass democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 1918, leading to a period of radical instability, including attempts to establish a First Hungarian Republic and a communist revolution with the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. After this period of chaos, a conservative authoritarian interwar regime with parliamentary features formed under Mikl\u00f3s Horthy, while democracy remained heavily restricted. Horthy\u2019s system was built around nationalism, anti-communism, and the restoration of social order after the upheavals of war and revolution, with political power concentrated in the hands of conservative elites despite the existence of formal parliamentary institutions. The regime also increasingly tied national identity to the idea that Hungary had been unfairly dismantled by the postwar settlement. It was in this atmosphere of political instability, national humiliation, and uncertainty over Hungary\u2019s future that the Treaty of Trianon was signed in 1920.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Treaty of Trianon drastically reduced Hungary\u2019s territory (by about two-thirds) and population after World War I. This led to a long-lasting sense of grievance and territorial revisionism, which developed into a political ideology of restoring \u201cGreater Hungary,\u201d sentiments that still exist in parts of society today. For many Hungarians, the issue is tied not only to lost territory itself, but also to the fact that large ethnic Hungarian communities remained outside Hungary\u2019s modern borders in countries such as Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine after the treaty was signed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the Western powers refused to revise the Trianon borders, Hungary increasingly aligned itself with Nazi Germany and later became an Axis ally during World War II, a period that ultimately ended with German occupation of the country in 1944. This marked one of the most extreme authoritarian phases in modern Hungarian history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: FORTEPAN\/ Ungv\u00e1ry Kriszti\u00e1n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After World War II, Hungary came under the political control of the Soviet Union. Opposition was removed from power, political arrests increased, and the secret police expanded its influence. A one-party system was established, free elections were abolished, ideological control over education and media was imposed, and the economy was centrally planned with agricultural collectivization. Forced confessions and show trials were also part of the system, which became fully institutionalized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The system reached a crisis during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, when mass protests demanding political freedom and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact were violently suppressed, resulting in thousands of deaths, imprisonments, and emigration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: FORTEPAN\/ Magyar Kultur\u00e1lis Int\u00e9zet Vars\u00f3-Fundacja Muzyka Odnaleziona<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1989, the communist system in Hungary collapsed peacefully compared to many other states in the region. Free elections were introduced in 1990, a new constitution was adopted, one-party rule formally ended, and Hungary became the Third Hungarian Republic. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this transition was not as simple as it may sound. Privatization and economic restructuring caused significant disruption, with unemployment and inequality rising rapidly. This contributed to social dissatisfaction with liberal capitalism and relatively low trust in parliament, partly due to the lack of a long democratic tradition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hungary alternated between center-right governments and center-left (post-communist successor) governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: FORTEPAN\/ Krisz\u00e1n \u00c1rp\u00e1d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Viktor Orb\u00e1n Transformed Hungary Through Successive Terms<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Across successive governments, corruption scandals became recurring, and political polarization remained strong, creating a fragile environment. As could be expected in such circumstances, Viktor Orb\u00e1n became prime minister in 1998. Why? After this period of instability, there was a growing desire for stronger leadership and clearer national direction. Orb\u00e1n campaigned on themes of Hungarian national pride, protection of national interests, skepticism toward external influence, criticism of socialist economic mismanagement, and promises of stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: White House (2001), Orb\u00e1n Viktor and George W. Bush, public domain image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the opposition remained strong enough to defeat him in 2002, when the Hungarian Socialist Party returned to power. At this stage, it is important to highlight that Hungary was on the path toward the European Union and joined in 2004, alongside several other Central and Eastern European countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Due to growing public dissatisfaction, corruption allegations, and the leaked speech of then Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcs\u00e1ny in which he admitted that the government had misrepresented the state of the economy to win elections, public outrage intensified and led to large-scale protests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following the financial crisis of 2008, Orb\u00e1n, then in opposition, once again campaigned on similar themes: breaking with what he described as corrupt post-communist elites, restoring national identity, and consolidating his political movement. This broader dissatisfaction ultimately resulted in Fidesz winning a two-thirds constitutional supermajority in parliament in the 2010 elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To understand the importance and scale of the changes that followed, it is necessary to explain what a supermajority means in the Hungarian political system. A two-thirds parliamentary majority allows for adopting or replacing the constitution, changing electoral laws (including how votes translate into parliamentary seats and how constituencies are drawn), shaping the media regulation framework, and restructuring courts and key state institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Put simply, the same political actor that wins elections can also redesign the institutional framework in ways that may structurally favor the incumbent party. Scholars often refer to this process as institutional capture<\/em>, where state structures are reshaped from within to serve the interests of those in power rather than the broader public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the opposition weakened after its electoral defeat, and given the timing and precise context of the political situation, Orb\u00e1n entered a particularly favorable environment for implementing such changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2011, Hungary adopted a new constitution, replacing the 1949 communist-era document, and gave a stronger executive role to the government, incorporated references to national values, and redefined key state institutions, with the opposition largely excluded from the drafting process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other widely discussed changes included the redrawing of electoral districts in ways that critics argue favored the ruling party, as well as adjustments to the electoral system that influenced how votes were translated into seats, including the reduction in the number of parliamentary seats from 386 to 199, which further strengthened the position of the winning majority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before 2010, Hungary used a two-round electoral system in single-member districts, which allowed opposition parties to coordinate in the second round. After Orb\u00e1n\u2019s reforms, this was replaced with a single-round system, making such coordination significantly more difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another important change concerned how surplus votes are counted. The winning party began receiving additional \u201ccompensation\u201d votes from districts it had already won, while opposition votes were often split across multiple candidates, effectively reducing their overall impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The threshold for smaller parties was also adjusted: while the basic threshold remained at 5% for individual parties, higher thresholds were introduced for joint party lists (10% for two-party alliances and 15% for alliances of three or more), making it more difficult for fragmented opposition groups to enter parliament through coalitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regulations on political advertising were also tightened. Campaign advertising on commercial television and radio was significantly restricted, with most political ads limited to public broadcasters and allocated free of charge. In practice, this reduced the visibility of opposition campaigns, particularly compared to the government\u2019s broader communication reach outside formal campaign periods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

They lowered the mandatory retirement age for judges, so many judges who had been appointed under earlier political systems were forced to retire and were replaced. At the same time, control over judicial administration was strengthened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Public media were reorganized and consolidated into a more centralized structure, with editorial leadership becoming more concentrated. At the same time, a significant portion of private media ownership became aligned with business groups aligned with the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2014, Fidesz once again won the elections and secured a two-thirds supermajority. One might wonder why, therefore, let me explain. Hungary exited the immediate financial instability of the previous years, and the government framed its policies as protecting households from the effects of the crisis. Tax benefits and family support programs proved politically popular, while GDP growth and overall economic performance improved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Alenka Bratu\u0161ek and Viktor Orb\u00e1n cutting the ribbon, public domain image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, the opposition remained divided, and the design of electoral districts, along with the system of vote translation, resulted in significant advantages for the ruling party. However, one of the most important factors was the European migration crisis. As is well known, Orb\u00e1n emphasized strong border protection, opposition to migration, and the construction of border fences, framing migration as an issue of national identity. This message appealed strongly to segments of the conservative society\u2019s emotions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Each year, his reforms became more stable and deeply embedded, and political dominance was consistently reinforced. This was particularly visible in the media industry, where the government developed broader and more consistent influence and reach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since 1989, Hungary has had no term limit for the Prime Minister, meaning he remains in power as long as their party secures a parliamentary majority. As in other parliamentary systems, the Prime Minister is not directly elected; instead, voters cast their ballots for party lists, and the leader of the winning party becomes Prime Minister.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the factors that contributed once again to Orb\u00e1n\u2019s reelection was, alongside the previously mentioned migration crisis, which shifted public attention away from other domestic issues and a modest improvement in the economy, particularly in wages (though unevenly distributed), the expansion of family-centered tax policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Unknown author (2017), \u201cMagyarorsz\u00e1g er\u0151s\u00f6dik!\u201d campaign billboard in Zichy\u00fajfalu, CC BY-SA 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead of general welfare expansion, the government focused on tax reductions for families with children, increasing benefits depending on the number of children, and introducing long-term incentives aimed at higher birth rates. Another major policy area was state-supported housing programs, especially for families, including subsidies for home purchases and preferential loans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A key feature of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s economic strategy is that it does not primarily target the poorest groups, but rather working families, lower-middle and middle-income households, and economically active citizens. In this way, the government also gained support among younger voters, which contrasts with neighboring Slovakia, where Robert Fico tends to rely more on support from older, retired generations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: EU2016 SK (Rastislav Polak), Bratislava Summit 2016, public domain image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

By the time of the 2018 elections, these policies had been in place long enough to produce visible results, allowing the government to point to tangible outcomes. From this perspective, it may be easier to understand why Hungarian voters supported Orb\u00e1n\u2019s government, even though it is often characterized as authoritarian. This also highlights that the issue is not one-dimensional, and it is important to avoid a strictly one-sided interpretation when discussing this topic. However, while these policies are often highlighted as achievements of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s government, some analysts argue that their effects may have been partly offset by broader cost pressures in the economy, including higher prices for goods and services faced by households. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

After being reelected, he further expanded his influence into other areas, including higher education reform. Universities were reorganized by transferring their management from direct state administration to so-called \u201cfoundation-based\u201d structures, where public universities were placed under publicly funded, but formally independent, foundations often led by boards with strong government influence. In practice, this shifted decision-making on budgets, leadership appointments, and strategic direction away from traditional academic governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, funding was increasingly aligned with government-preferred institutions in the academic and cultural sphere. This included a reallocation of state resources toward organizations, universities, and cultural institutions considered more aligned with government priorities, while others experienced relative financial pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the most commonly used examples of how regulatory changes and new operational conditions impacted foreign universities was the example of the Central European University (CEU) which was founded by Soros in 1991 in Budapest, and was initially focused on supporting democracy in post-communist European countries. It became associated with liberal academic thought and EU-oriented policy research, and offered dual accreditation in the United States while being funded from abroad. In practice, institutions that were less willing to align with these domestic policy changes faced increasing pressure. CEU eventually relocated its main operations to Vienna.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, NGOs were often viewed as adversaries of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s government, largely because many received foreign funding, promoted values that conflicted with government positions, and played an active role in shaping domestic political debates. As early as 2013, scrutiny of the NGO sector intensified, with Hungary introducing regulations requiring organizations receiving foreign support to register as foreign-funded entities, disclose their financial sources, and comply with stricter reporting obligations, justified by the argument of the need for transparency and protection against external influence. Over time, this developed into broader administrative oversight and compliance monitoring, prompting criticism from the European Union and raising legal concerns over restrictions on civil society. In political and media discourse, this aggressive approach was often reinforced through recurring messaging that linked NGOs to migration-related issues, framing them as part of a wider external influence on domestic affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another related controversy was Orb\u00e1n\u2019s use of George Soros as a scapegoat across multiple election campaign cycles, especially after 2015 when the migration crisis began. George Soros is a billionaire originally born in Hungary during the Nazi occupation. As his family was Jewish, he later left Hungary, moved to the United States, and became one of the most successful investors there. He also established a philanthropic network, the Open Society Foundations, which has donated more than $32 billion of his personal fortune to support various NGOs in around 120 countries worldwide, including organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and others working in the fields of human rights, democracy, rule of law, migration, free elections, anti-corruption, and academic and media freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some NGOs funded by Soros were active in Hungary during the migration crisis, primarily providing humanitarian assistance and support for refugees. During the 2018 campaign in particular, Orb\u00e1n\u2019s government launched nationwide billboard campaigns portraying Soros as a central campaign figure, while also linking parts of the opposition to him and frequently referencing him in media and political debates in a way that carried negative connotations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Public interest asset management foundations were also created. These are legal entities that receive significant public assets transferred into their control. Although formally independent, their governance structures are typically appointed in ways that ensure long-term alignment with state policy direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, tensions with the European Union increased significantly. It is important to point out that these tensions had existed earlier as well, but were largely framed as disagreements within a shared institutional framework. After 2018, however, the conflict became broader and more structural, focusing on the nature of Hungary\u2019s political system and its compliance with EU rule-of-law standards, particularly regarding judicial independence, consistency in legal enforcement, and institutional constraints on executive power. The European Union is built on a set of core values defined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, including respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the protection of fundamental rights, including minority rights. These principles are not merely rhetorical statements but are designed to shape how member states operate in practice, reinforcing mutual trust across the EU\u2019s legal and financial systems. Over the past years, Hungary has faced repeated criticism from EU institutions and monitoring bodies for not fully meeting these standards across a range of policy and governance areas. In response, the EU has progressively shifted from mainly political messaging to more tangible enforcement tools, including regular rule-of-law assessments, legal infringement proceedings, and, most notably, the use of financial conditionality that ties to the EU funds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: European Parliament Multimedia Centre (2019), EP press conference before EU summit featuring Viktor Orb\u00e1n, CC BY 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Hungarian government, in turn, emphasized sovereignty and resistance to external institutional pressure, which led to growing political disagreement and increasingly open confrontation between the two sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2022, the EU for the first time activated the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism against Hungary. This targeted concerns related to corruption risks, public procurement practices, transparency of state funding, media pluralism, and restructuring of electoral and regulatory systems in ways that reduce institutional checks and balances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result, approximately 55% of cohesion funds intended for regional development and infrastructure, around \u20ac6.3 billion, were suspended in 2022. Overall, across all EU funding budget cycles, around 21- 22 billion in cohesion funds, recovery and resilience funding, and other structural programs. In addition, around \u20ac5\u20136 billion in grants and loans under Hungary\u2019s Recovery and Resilience Plan have been affected or delayed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, Hungarian universities reorganized under state-linked foundations were excluded from EU programs such as Erasmus+ and parts of Horizon Europe, limiting participation in student exchange and research funding networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2022, Fidesz\u2013KDNP won a fourth consecutive term. This election took place in the context of the Russia\u2013Ukraine war rising along Hungary\u2019s borders, and the government emphasized avoiding direct involvement in the conflict, protecting national security, and ensuring energy stability. It also sought to shield households from external shocks through the continuation of previously introduced domestic economic policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hungary did not allow the transit of weapons through its territory to Ukraine and consistently maintained a position of non-involvement in direct military support, aiming to avoid being drawn into a wider conflict. At the same time, Hungary\u2019s relationship with Russia became one of the most controversial aspects of its foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Together with neighboring Slovakia, Hungary remains highly dependent on Russian gas imports and continued energy cooperation with Russia. The government resisted a full economic detachment from Russian energy, arguing that this approach was based on supply stability, cost considerations, and long-standing infrastructure dependence through established contracts and pipeline systems. As a result, Hungary often sought exemptions or delays in sanctions affecting energy imports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This period significantly deepened already existing tensions with the European Union. Although Hungary remained within the collective EU sanctions framework and formally supported all major sanction packages, it frequently delayed agreement during negotiations, requested exemptions, and criticized certain measures as economically harmful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude his terms in office, it is also important to mention the individual corruption allegations surrounding Viktor Orb\u00e1n and his broader political network, which, alongside systemic corruption concerns raised by critics, have become one of the factors contributing to growing public fatigue over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the most frequently discussed examples involves Orb\u00e1n\u2019s extended circle of family members and close associates, particularly the case of L\u0151rinc M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros. M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros is a Hungarian businessman who, within a short period after 2010, rapidly became one of the wealthiest individuals in Hungary. His companies expanded rapidly from local-level construction activity to major national projects, particularly in sectors closely connected to public spending and EU-funded investments. He is originally from the same town as Orb\u00e1n, which has often been noted in public debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to his official asset declarations, Orb\u00e1n reports limited personal savings; however, his broader business network and family-linked holdings are significantly more extensive. His father earned billions of euros, and his brothers also own successful companies, and those companies are subcontractors of various public projects in construction and land-related business. Companies linked to long-term associates received major state contracts and investments in Orb\u00e1n\u2019s hometown area. The structures surrounding the vast Hatvanpuszta estate, a former Habsburg manor now owned by Orb\u00e1n\u2019s father, are often cited as an example of one of Orb\u00e1ns estates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another case is the stadium and the training complex host Felcs\u00fat FC, the club founded by Orb\u00e1n, which has received tens of millions of euros in public funding through a system allowing companies to deduct donations to sports clubs from their tax liabilities. M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros serves as president of the foundation that manages the team.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nearby is Botaniq, an exclusive golf club owned by Orb\u00e1n\u2019s father, as well as Hotel Pancho, which originally served as accommodation for youth sports but has since been transformed into a four-star hotel operated by a non-profit organization linked to Orb\u00e1n\u2019s circle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

These are only some of the examples illustrating the broader network of companies, foundations, institutions, and hotels associated with the Orb\u00e1n family. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Latest Elections: Why Hungary\u2019s Political Shift Matters<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

On 12 April 2026, parliamentary elections took place with a turnout of 79%, making it one of the highest since 1989. The central question of the election was whether Orb\u00e1n would continue in power after 16 years or be replaced. Even before the elections, indications of a possible Tisza victory were visible; however, some pro-government polling suggested that Fidesz was leading or roughly tied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Clyde H. Mapping (2023), The Stakes of the Election (23)<\/em>, CC BY-SA 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The overall campaign environment was highly unfair and dirty, marked by aggressive rhetoric and concerns about fairness, particularly regarding unequal media coverage and promotion. The intentional targeting of Tisza and its leadership became a concerning feature of the campaign. Orb\u00e1n used personal targeting, including accusations of conspiring with foreign intelligence, opposition being described as \u201cpro-war,\u201d and intending to reintroduce military conscription or send young Hungarians to fight in Ukraine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Beroesz (2019), EP election campaign posters along EuroVelo 11 cycle path in Szeged-Sz\u0151reg, CC BY-SA 2.5 Hungary image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Magyar, for his part, stated that he had been effectively excluded from public media appearances since 2024. The campaign was also characterized by the widespread use of propaganda, online political messaging, including massive circulation of manipulated or AI-generated images and videos, mostly on platforms such as Facebook and X. This included edited videos, misleading imagery, and conspiracy-driven narratives, which further intensified concerns about the role of Russian disinformation interference. As much as external interference may be present, the question remains whether too much attention and analytical weight is sometimes given to Russian information campaigns, which may not always be as effective as they are often portrayed, or whether they are in fact significantly present in countries of interest with the intent of contributing to political polarization and the division of Europe, a question that remains open for further research. However, evidence of both state and party-linked disinformation campaigns was easy to observe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Orb\u00e1n also used his link with other nationalist and populist leaders, most notably Donald Trump, who publicly expressed support, admiration, and maintained a long-standing political relationship with Orb\u00e1n. U.S. Vice President JD Vance visited Budapest just before the elections to support Orb\u00e1n, and Orb\u00e1n travelled to the US to meet President Trump. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Daniel Torok \/ The White House (2025), Visit of Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n at the White House, public domain (U.S. federal government work), via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Orb\u00e1n has maintained strong ties with like-minded European figures such as Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, all of whom share similar positions on sovereignty, migration, and opposition to liberalism. He used this as a sign of international support and his position on a world stage to appeal to voters who wish for Hungary\u2019s strong international position. He also attended regular meetings with Russian President Putin to balance the foreign policy between East and West. However, while these connections were intended to strengthen Orb\u00e1n\u2019s image as part of an international conservative movement, they ultimately failed to translate into domestic electoral success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, Tisza campaigned on a different rhetoric. It promoted systemic change, with anti-corruption as its central theme, alongside transparent public procurement, investigation of past state contracts, and the gradual correction of economic imbalances. Most importantly, it emphasized a \u201creturn to Europe.\u201d The party promised to bring back home frozen EU funds and restore trust and cooperation with European institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, Tisza largely avoided strong ideological labels, instead adopting a neutral and rational tone with a centrist positioning. It focused on reversing parts of the Orb\u00e1n system and restoring judicial independence, media pluralism, limits on executive power, and greater institutional transparency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What played into Magyar\u2019s advantage was the fact that he was a former member of Fidesz and had previously been married to the Minister of Justice, Judit Varga. In political science, this phenomenon is often referred to as elite defection, meaning influential members of a ruling or powerful group withdraw their support or switch allegiance. As a result, Orb\u00e1n\u2019s usual campaign strategies were less effective against him, since accusations of inexperience or a lack of understanding of the country would indirectly reflect back on his own former political environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some critics argued that, given his previous role within the system, he could not be fully trusted or that he had betrayed his former party. However, Magyar addressed this narrative by acknowledging that he had been part of the political structure but argued that he became too dissatisfied with how it functioned, particularly on moral grounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In comparison to Fidesz, Tisza did not rely solely on the traditional voter base but instead tried to appeal to a broader range of groups, including former Fidesz voters who had become disappointed and desired change without abandoning national identity, urban liberal voters, previously undecided voters, as well as many young or first-time and previously inactive voters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When referring to \u201cwithout abandoning national identity,\u201d it is important to add that Tisza did not exclude the element of national identity or the sense of being Hungarian. Rather, it presented it in a different way, as maintaining sovereignty without isolation, national pride without conflict, and stability through strong but fair institutions. The party avoided adopting a fully liberal approach or appearing pro-war, as this could have pushed away more conservative voters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, its campaign emphasized closeness to the European Union while still using national language, symbols, and values. It avoided framing political debates in terms of progressive versus traditional or portraying Hungary as fundamentally problematic. Instead, it spoke on behalf of the country as one, not just a part of society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another key step was that, in contrast to Orb\u00e1n\u2019s campaigning in rural areas, small towns, and villages that were more dependent on state resources and less reached by opposition campaigns, Magyar sought to break the stereotype of the opposition being exclusively Budapest-centered. He travelled to local forums, town-hall meetings, and areas that had previously been largely ignored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He focused on listening to the daily concerns and problems of citizens, addressing economic realities such as access to public services, local employment, and infrastructure. Instead of relying on state-controlled media, the campaign built its presence through repeated in-person visits and direct engagement with local communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

My immediate realization during his campaign was the observation of his name itself. Names can carry strong political messaging, especially in national identity- focused political environments, like Hungary. In Hungarian, \u201cMagyar\u201d means \u201cHungarian.\u201d Although there is no official indication of use of this factor in the campaign strategy, it likely contributed to memorability, resonance, and identification.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This can be understood as part of broader psychological effects on voters, where, even without conscious reflection, symbolic familiarity may influence perception. In this sense, the name itself fits into a broader strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Surely one of the major reasons for Tisza winning the parliamentary elections was that public dissatisfaction had accumulated over 16 years, creating a strong desire for change, but also their brilliant campaigning strategy. To secure such broad support across a complex electorate, often split between more conservative older voters and younger, more progressive groups, it required a deep understanding of people\u2019s views and careful balancing of their different interests, supported by precise, careful and well- calculated strategic decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Clyde H. Mapping (2026), Hungary election results visualization (Tisza gradient map), CC BY-SA 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tisza received 141 seats, gaining a clear majority in the parliament (compared to Fidesz, which received 52 seats). As Tisza secured over 50% of the vote, it was able to form a government independently, which contrasts with many other parliamentary systems where coalitions are often more fragile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the party committed itself to representing different parts of society, satisfying and balancing the expectations of a diverse voter base. This was reflected in its informal alignment with other opposition forces and in the broad electoral coalition that enabled its success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, the central focus, and naturally the main challenge, shifted from coalition formation to coalition maintenance, as the government seeks to balance the expectations of a politically heterogeneous electorate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Tisza Majority: Expectations, Promises, and the Future of Hungary<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

With the election results now clear and the immediate political momentum having settled, it is possible to more realistically assess the expectations facing the new government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: European Parliament (2025), Group photo of delegation of Hungarian MEPs, CC BY 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

First of all, what about Orb\u00e1n? After his electoral defeat, Orb\u00e1n is not expected to lead the parliamentary opposition. Instead, he claimed an intention to reorganize his political camp at a time when facing internal pressure within his party, and discussions about potential leadership changes have also appeared.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Alain Rolland \/ European Parliament (2024), Viktor Orb\u00e1n and P\u00e9ter Magyar at European Parliament plenary session, CC BY 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There have been public reports suggesting that individuals connected to the previous government may have been relocating assets and accumulated wealth to various countries, including destinations such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, the United States, Singapore, and Uruguay. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some accounts also suggest that many figures associated with the former government have left the country following the announcement of investigations, while opposition voices have alleged that individuals connected to business networks around L\u0151rinc M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros could be among those affected. There have also been claims regarding the removal or destruction of administrative records. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the victory of Tisza, the first steps have been taken and statements articulated by its leadership. Magyar stated that his first official visit would be to Poland, which took place shortly after the election results, with Warsaw chosen as a symbolic first stop, signaling a \u201creturn to Europe,\u201d alignment with a similar democratic transition model, and support of regional cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He also met with representatives of the European Commission and the European Council, as EU officials broadly welcomed the election result. In addition, Magyar proposed reopening dialogue with Volodymyr Zelenskyy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taken together, foreign policy repositioning is one of the main points of the new government. However, Magyar has also expressed opposition to Hungary\u2019s participation in the EU\u2019s proposed \u20ac90 billion loan package for Ukraine, insisted that any peace settlement must include Ukraine as a direct party to negotiations, and has not supported accelerating Ukraine\u2019s path toward EU membership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tisza avoided signaling any abrupt institutional purges, economic shocks, or radical transformations, instead adopting a more gradual approach of normalization. At the same time, it will inherit significant difficulties, as the existing economic model is not easily reversible even after political change. These include a constrained budget, high public debt (around five per cent of GDP for several years), and spending restraints.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the short term, some adjustment costs are likely, including persistent inequality, uneven regional development, and adjustment costs for lower-income workers. The government is expected to prioritize fiscal consolidation, with a likely aim of reducing the budget deficit to around 3.5\u20134% of GDP. This could involve scaling back some of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s key policies, such as family benefits, pension supplements, and energy bill subsidies in order to meet euro- adoption criteria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compared to the previous government, Tisza has also signaled a willingness to discuss euro adoption as a long-term objective. However, this would require meeting the Maastricht criteria about stable inflation, mentioned lower public debt, and exchange rate stability, along with other criteria, but it remains a significant challenge. As of 2026, Hungary continues to face structural constraints, such as dependence on external investment and inflationary pressures, meaning that euro adoption is not immediately feasible. Even in the longer term, such a step would depend not only on economic convergence but also on public support. To add, progress toward these criteria would be economically beneficial, even if full adoption is delayed or abandoned. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Tisza may seek to maintain political support by increasing take-home pay through targeted tax reductions for low- and middle-income earners, a measure that aligns with politically appealing pro-family and pro-work policies while avoiding direct conflict with employers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reintegration with the European Union is expected to bring investment stability and institutional support, particularly through improved compliance with rule-of-law conditions. However, this will also involve stricter fiscal oversight, reform conditionalities, and budgetary requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Unknown author (2026), Hungarian political\/election image, CC BY 4.0 image via Wikimedia Commons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Domestically, Tisza is expected to prioritize public services far more than Orb\u00e1n\u2019s political party has in recent years, with planned reforms in healthcare, education, social welfare, child protection, and public transportation. The party\u2019s programme suggests limiting excessive state intervention while encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises and creating a more predictable environment for investors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the short term, financial markets reacted positively to the election outcome. The Hungarian forint appreciated by around 3% against the euro, reaching a four-year high. Investor confidence was also reflected in the stock market, where major companies such as OTP Bank, MOL, Richter, Magyar Telekom, and Opus Global recorded gains of approximately 2\u20135% right after the results were announced, contributing to an overall improvement in market sentiment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude on the topic of the economy, normalization and improved EU relations will likely lead to an overall increase in living standards. However, the continuation of this momentum will depend heavily on policy direction and effective implementation, as well as external conditions. Ongoing tensions in the Middle East are already pushing up global energy and commodity prices, which directly affect Hungary, given its strong dependence on imported energy. These developments will inevitably require politically difficult decisions, particularly when it comes to social spending.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the most symbolically significant post-2026 proposals in the areas of anti-corruption and EU reintegration is the discussion about Hungary potentially joining the European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (EPPO). EPPO is an independent EU body that investigates fraud involving EU funds and operates above national prosecution systems, which also helps explain why Hungary did not join under Orb\u00e1n. Membership in EPPO is seen in Brussels as a trust-building measure and would likely increase the chances of unlocking and restoring EU funds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another major question for Hungarian voters is related to the migration. Here, a stricter stance is not expected to change significantly. Magyar has indicated that he plans to maintain the southern border fortifications, uphold strict border enforcement, and continue rejecting large-scale irregular migration. At the same time, the government is expected to introduce tighter control over non-EU worker recruitment and reduce reliance on third-country labour inflows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, Tisza also proposes a broader pan-European approach. In certain sectors, the economy still depends on foreign workers, particularly as demographic decline and labour shortages in manufacturing continue to intensify.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding expectations of foreign policy changes, the attitude toward Russia is expected to become tougher. Magyar pointed out that Hungary will heavily diversify its energy supplies, while not completely cutting itself off from Russian energy in the short term. He stated that Russian cooperation with Europe depends on Russia ending its war in Ukraine. During the campaign, the powerful message of \u201cRussians out\u201d resonated, and this firmer stance toward Russian influence will remain. The slogan carried strong historical symbolism, as memories of Soviet domination after World War II and the suppression of the 1956 uprising still shape political attitudes across generations. In the context of the 2026 elections, it also reflected growing frustration among parts of the electorate with the perception that Budapest had become too politically and economically dependent on Moscow under Orb\u00e1n\u2019s leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The United States is also seen as an important partner with whom Hungary should maintain close relations, and Magyar plans to invite the U.S. president to the celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Budapest in October.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Magyar is also expected to strengthen relationships with Central European countries, particularly within the Visegr\u00e1d Group, while expressing interest in broader regional cooperation, and including countries such as Slovenia, Croatia, and Romania.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During Orb\u00e1n\u2019s time in office, Hungary became a place where many foreign political figures sought asylum, for example, the former Polish Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro. Magyar has indicated that such individuals will face extradition to their countries of origin if they have not already departed voluntarily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude with expected domestic adjustments, the anticipated changes are likely to include the depoliticization of public administration, with stricter rules on political appointments and merit-based recruitment. This would be accompanied by stronger independence of regulatory bodies, mandatory asset declaration transparency, improved monitoring systems, and better tracking of public contracts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Further changes may involve curriculum adjustments in the education system, improved access to public information, and greater media transparency, although not necessarily a full structural reform. Digital transformation is also expected, including the reduction of in-person bureaucratic procedures and the potential introduction of digital ID and document systems, possibly supported by the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition, reforms may target healthcare infrastructure modernization, increased use of EU-funded development projects, expansion of affordable housing programs in urban areas, and improved transparency in the rental market. More competitive public tendering systems and a stronger role for expert advisory bodies are also likely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, these adjustments point toward a shift away from symbolic political messaging and confrontational governance, toward a more technocratic, consultative, and policy-oriented approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article followed Hungary\u2019s political development from the emergence of the Hungarian state to the present day, focusing on the key historical and political episodes that shaped the country\u2019s political system. The aim was to give readers with little prior context a clearer picture of the developments and political dynamics that continue to influence Hungary today.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Author: Ema Hor\u0148\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1 This article provides an analysis of Hungary\u2019s political development, covering the historical background, all terms of Viktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s leadership, recent elections, and possible future trajectories, serving as context for understanding the structure and evolution of the Hungarian political system. After the seemingly never-ending rule of Viktor Orb\u00e1n, the long-standing tradition of authoritarianism […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"saved_in_kubio":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-576","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/576","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=576"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/576\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":594,"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/576\/revisions\/594"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=576"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=576"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/futuredemo.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=576"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}